Voting machines – Page 6 – Show Me The Votes

New voting machines for Kansas Counties

The following appeared as an editorial in The Wichita Eagle.
http://www.kansas.com/opinion/opn-columns-blogs/article41620107.html

Sedgwick, Shawnee, Johnson and Wyandotte counties recently issued a poorly worded request for proposals for a new voting system. As a result, the new system on which we vote beginning in 2017 could be just as resistant to independent monitoring – and just as vulnerable to hacking – as the machines on which we vote now.

But such a catastrophe need not result if voters demand a new voting system that:

▪ Allows voters to mark paper ballots.

▪ Counts votes using open-source software.

▪ And allows postelection audits to verify election results.

These are not unreasonable requirements. Many localities, including the state of New Mexico and Douglas County here in Kansas, use paper ballots.

But it’s a different story in counties such as Sedgwick that use turn-of-the-century touch-screen electronic voting machines. The audit of 2014 election results that I am trying to do here will be difficult and expensive – assuming the courts allow me to proceed. Even if I gain access to the paper tapes on which votes are recorded in Sedgwick County, I might not be able to detect rigging of individual machines.

That’s true, in part, because the software that runs Sedgwick County’s current voting machines is proprietary – owned by the machines’ manufacturer and not accessible to researchers. This is morally wrong. Audits should be routine after every election. These should be conducted by independent auditors.

The three requirements listed above are all necessary for votes to be transparently counted and for election results to be verified and audited. If any of the requirements is compromised, election results are susceptible to undetectable tampering, as appears to be the case in Sedgwick County now.

The four counties’ request for proposals may not require paper ballots, open-source software and independent auditing, but it also doesn’t preclude them. Therefore, I propose a letter campaign regarding the RFP to Sedgwick County, which is acting as the lead agent for this contract. Voters from all four counties should insist that their public servants adopt a new voting system that is transparent and accountable.

Readers who share these concerns should express them to: Kimberly Evans, purchasing agent, Sedgwick County Division of Finance, Purchasing Office, 525 N. Main, Suite 823, Wichita, KS 67203.

How trustworthy are electronic voting systems in the US?

I’ve recently written an article for the Royal Statistical Society on the trustworthiness of US voting systems. Here is an excerpt:

My statistical analysis shows patterns indicative of vote manipulation in machines. The manipulation is relatively small, compared with the inherent variability of election results, but it is consistent. These results form a pattern that goes across the nation and back a number of election cycles. I’ve downloaded data and verified the results from several states for myself. Furthermore, the manipulation is not limited to a single powerful operator. My assessment is that the data reveals multiple (at least two) agents working independently to successfully alter voting results.

You’ll find the article in its entirety, here:
http://www.statslife.org.uk/significance/politics/2288-how-trustworthy-are-electronic-voting-systems-in-the-us

Interesting Question: Couldn’t other factors explain the patterns in the data?

The answer to this question is “Yes, it’s possible”. I’ve seen several claims that people can explain the patterns in the data that I find concerning with voter registration of party and/or % turnout by party and/or other demographic variables. I haven’t yet done much analysis into these factors, primarily because I haven’t had access to precinct level data. I’m working on that and may have an acceptable database of those statistics ready soon.

At the county level, for the data I’ve looked at, such factors only explain a portion of the trend. Further, the pattern in the cum sum % analysis is not what would be expected by demographic type factors. We should see a leveling out after a rise due to those factors, not the continuous increase those models frequently show. If you check the Wisconsin graph, broken down by voting machine type, the pattern I would expect to see exhibited for that type of issue is shown by the purple line as opposed to the red lines (increasing) or the green line (paper ballots only).

However, even if all these patterns (which are consistent across different states and elections while showing similarities by voting machine type) are explainable in such a manner. At this point, I consider the fact that our voting machines in Sedgwick County have never been audited or checked for accuracy after an election to be equally concerning. Without such an audit, we do not know whether the votes have been counted accurately. IMO, that’s a serious problem and my lawsuit at least illuminates that issue even if I never get access to the paper audit trail.

It’s too much trouble to show me the votes.

Sedgwick County Election Commissioner’s response

lawsuit

Like Mr. Kobach’s response, there is a long list of stuff I got wrong. Most notably, I didn’t get Ms. Lehman’s title correct, inadvertently including an ‘s’ at the end of election. I should apologize for that. I knew she was particular about that, but I forgot which one was right and guessed wrong. My bad.

Both her response and Kobach’s response emphasized that she is the custodian of the records and Kris is not an appropriate defendant for this case. I’m fine with dismissing Kobach as a defendant unless the judge feels differently. I simply wasn’t sure who was the right person and was advised to name both in the lawsuit. Again, my bad. Hopefully all these errors will not fatally compromise my case.

Paragraph 5 is my real first disagreement with her response. While there is nothing in the law that requires any credentials for a normal open records request, voting ballots are specifically exempted from that treatment. If these records constitute ballots, as determined in my 2013 lawsuit, then they are NOT available at request, but require a judge’s permission, allowing the judge to make the call.

Academic research with proper protocols to protect privacy are situations where a judge may find it reasonable to grant access to otherwise sealed records. My credentials lend my case credence rather than being irrelevant. I am hoping a judge can grant me access to these records to conduct a study without setting a precedent of these records being available to anyone who asks for any reason.

In addition, if these records are considered ballots, they should be made available for review during a recount. I filed a recount request after the 2014 election, specifically asking to examine those “ballots”. I was informed that the R.T.A.L. records would not be made available for the purpose of conducting a recount.

Paragraph 8 is wrong. Summary tapes allow her office to add up the votes cast per candidate from each precinct rather than accepting the computed totals. They do NOT allow for verifying that the total votes cast per candidate for each precinct is correct. That detailed verification is the reason the R.T.A.L. records exist. Ms. Lehman concedes in paragraph 9 that such an audit has never been performed on the voting machines in Sedgwick County. That she has never done such an audit and, in addition, will not make those records available for a recount is why I have sued for permission to do it myself.

Paragraph 17 states that it would be “unnecessarily burdensome” (too much trouble) to produce these records. It will not be quite as difficult as she envisions, although it will still be an effort to do the audit I have planned. I am not interested in the results for paper ballots cast by mail or provisionally. I am asking permission to conduct a post-election audit of the tabulated machine results via the R.T.A.L. records for the 2014 election to verify the results of the summary tapes for votes cast on election day and determine the error rate for the machines versus a human count of the R.T.A.L. records.

I will be happy to work with her staff to minimize the disruption to her office but due to the admittedly lax organization of these records, all 42 boxes will have to be opened and inventoried to determine whether or not each roll is part of the chosen sample. However, only the rolls in the sample will need to be reviewed or copied. I estimate the sample will comprise a few dozen R.T.A.L. rolls.

It cannot be denied that going through each record will be a laborious and tedious task, but if copies are allowed, this becomes my task, not Ms. Lehmans.

Kobach says NO!

This is my assessment of Kobach’s response to my lawsuit seeking voting machine records. I’ll be writing about Tabitha Lehman’s response in a separate post.

Paragraphs 1 through 8 seem to be a litany of complaints about how I done the law stuff wrong. I have no clue how to respond to those. Thankfully, with all the publicity I’ve received, I have had some offers of free legal advice. I will be taking people up on those offers of help.

Paragraph 9 is a claim that he has no authority to direct Tabitha Lehman, his co-defendant, in regard to either control of or access to those records. Since both he and Ms. Lehman are in agreement about that aspect, and if the judge concurs, I have no objection to dismissing Mr. Kobach as a defendant to this lawsuit although I am a little puzzled as to why, as SOS, he would have no jurisdiction over these records.

I’m also puzzled about why, if that is the case, he didn’t respond with a motion to dismiss him as defendant? That’s what Mr. Schmidt, our attorney general, did when I originally filed this case on Feb 2nd naming him as the defendant. I was grateful the judge was willing to allow me to refile with a different defendant. Unfortunately, neither the judge nor the opposing counsel could tell me who was the proper defendant. I was advised by a lawyer sympathetic to my case to file against both Kobach and Lehman, hopefully hitting the correct target with one of them. Apparently correct defendant is Tabitha Lehman, so even if I fail with this case, I’ve learned that much.

Paragraph 10 discusses K.S.A. 25-2422. Note the final clause of the first sentence “except as ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction“. I presume the Sedgwick County Court is the court with proper jurisdiction. This law is why I have been forced to file suit. If this court sees fit to grant me access to those records, then the law allows it. It is not a crime for me to see them.

Paragraph 11 references my previous lawsuit, in 2013, to gain access to these records for the 2010 election for precinct 208.

Paragraph 12 Kobach claims that this case is the same and therefore, the same outcome is already determined. I hope the judge will consider this lawsuit materially different with respect to the main reason given for denial of my previous case. The judge declined my petition in 2013 citing concern about voter privacy, because if any citizen could gain access to the records of any specific precinct, it could potentially be used to compromise the privacy of the voting booth.

This case is different because I am asking for permission to study a random sample of voting stations, not a specific precinct. Ms. Lehman is welcome to provide the seed to generate the random sample thereby guaranteeing the sample could not be determined in advance. This will preserve voter privacy.

I am asking the judge to grant me, with my academic and professional credentials, access to these records to conduct a study without setting a precedent of the records being available to anyone who asks for any reason. The judge can, of course, set appropriate criteria for the access in order to maintain the security and integrity of those records. I can work with Ms. Lehman and her staff to minimize the cost and disruption to her office if this access is allowed.

Paragraphs 13 through 15 comprise another litany of complaints about how I done the law stuff wrong. He’s likely right about all or most of the legal technicalities. Hopefully, I can get a lawyer to look this stuff over and help me respond correctly.

Then at the bottom, “WHEREFORE, answering Defendant Secretary of State pray that the court deny the relief requested, that he have costs herein, and such other and further relief as deemed just and reasonable in the premises.”

As I read this, Kris Kobach is saying, “No, don’t let her see those records and please let me bill her for the trouble she’s caused me.” He is a sweetheart, ain’t he!