More on the Kentucky Governor’s Race

Questioning the Unverified Computer Results of Kentucky’s Governor’s Race: ‘BradCast’ 11/4/2015

Bev Harris, of BlackBoxVoting.org, who I spoke with earlier today, described the higher vote totals in the down ballot races as a “significant anomaly”. She tells me that, at least until more records are requested and examined, the KY-Gov’s race “has to be looked at as a questionable outcome, particularly because of the discrepancies in the down ballot races. More votes in those races and not at the top…that just doesn’t happen.”

How trustworthy are electronic voting systems in the US?

I’ve recently written an article for the Royal Statistical Society on the trustworthiness of US voting systems. Here is an excerpt:

My statistical analysis shows patterns indicative of vote manipulation in machines. The manipulation is relatively small, compared with the inherent variability of election results, but it is consistent. These results form a pattern that goes across the nation and back a number of election cycles. I’ve downloaded data and verified the results from several states for myself. Furthermore, the manipulation is not limited to a single powerful operator. My assessment is that the data reveals multiple (at least two) agents working independently to successfully alter voting results.

You’ll find the article in its entirety, here:
http://www.statslife.org.uk/significance/politics/2288-how-trustworthy-are-electronic-voting-systems-in-the-us

Interesting Question: Couldn’t other factors explain the patterns in the data?

The answer to this question is “Yes, it’s possible”. I’ve seen several claims that people can explain the patterns in the data that I find concerning with voter registration of party and/or % turnout by party and/or other demographic variables. I haven’t yet done much analysis into these factors, primarily because I haven’t had access to precinct level data. I’m working on that and may have an acceptable database of those statistics ready soon.

At the county level, for the data I’ve looked at, such factors only explain a portion of the trend. Further, the pattern in the cum sum % analysis is not what would be expected by demographic type factors. We should see a leveling out after a rise due to those factors, not the continuous increase those models frequently show. If you check the Wisconsin graph, broken down by voting machine type, the pattern I would expect to see exhibited for that type of issue is shown by the purple line as opposed to the red lines (increasing) or the green line (paper ballots only).

2014 Wisc. Gov Race

However, even if all these patterns (which are consistent across different states and elections while showing similarities by voting machine type) are explainable in such a manner. At this point, I consider the fact that our voting machines in Sedgwick County have never been audited or checked for accuracy after an election to be equally concerning. Without such an audit, we do not know whether the votes have been counted accurately. IMO, that’s a serious problem and my lawsuit at least illuminates that issue even if I never get access to the paper audit trail.

It’s too much trouble to show me the votes.

    This is my response to Tabitha Lehman, Sedgwick County Election Commissioner’s response to my lawsuit.

    Like Mr. Kobach’s response, there is a long list of stuff I got wrong. Most notably, I didn’t get Ms. Lehman’s title correct, inadvertently including an ‘s’ at the end of election. I should apologize for that. I knew she was particular about that, but I forgot which one was right and guessed wrong. My bad.

    Both her response and Kobach’s response emphasized that she is the custodian of the records and Kris is not an appropriate defendant for this case. I’m fine with dismissing Kobach as a defendant unless the judge feels differently. I simply wasn’t sure who was the right person and was advised to name both in the lawsuit. Again, my bad. Hopefully all these errors will not fatally compromise my case.

    Paragraph 5 is my real first disagreement with her response. While there is nothing in the law that requires any credentials for a normal open records request, voting ballots are specifically exempted from that treatment. If these records constitute ballots, as determined in my 2013 lawsuit, then they are NOT available at request, but require a judge’s permission, allowing the judge to make the call.

    Academic research with proper protocols to protect privacy are situations where a judge may find it reasonable to grant access to otherwise sealed records. My credentials lend my case credence rather than being irrelevant. I am hoping a judge can grant me access to these records to conduct a study without setting a precedent of these records being available to anyone who asks for any reason.

    In addition, if these records are considered ballots, they should be made available for review during a recount. I filed a recount request after the 2014 election, specifically asking to examine those “ballots”. I was informed that the R.T.A.L. records would not be made available for the purpose of conducting a recount.

    Paragraph 8 is wrong. Summary tapes allow her office to add up the votes cast per candidate from each precinct rather than accepting the computed totals. They do NOT allow for verifying that the total votes cast per candidate for each precinct is correct. That detailed verification is the reason the R.T.A.L. records exist. Ms. Lehman concedes in paragraph 9 that such an audit has never been performed on the voting machines in Sedgwick County. That she has never done such an audit and, in addition, will not make those records available for a recount is why I have sued for permission to do it myself.

    Paragraph 17 states that it would be “unnecessarily burdensome” (too much trouble) to produce these records. It will not be quite as difficult as she envisions, although it will still be an effort to do the audit I have planned. I am not interested in the results for paper ballots cast by mail or provisionally. I am asking permission to conduct a post-election audit of the tabulated machine results via the R.T.A.L. records for the 2014 election to verify the results of the summary tapes for votes cast on election day and determine the error rate for the machines versus a human count of the R.T.A.L. records.

    I will be happy to work with her staff to minimize the disruption to her office but due to the admittedly lax organization of these records, all 42 boxes will have to be opened and inventoried to determine whether or not each roll is part of the chosen sample. However, only the rolls in the sample will need to be reviewed or copied. I estimate the sample will comprise a few dozen R.T.A.L. rolls.

    It cannot be denied that going through each record will be a laborious and tedious task, but if copies are allowed, this becomes my task, not Ms. Lehmans.